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ABSTRACT 
 
Performance differences between firms are generally attributed to organizational factors – 
such as routines, knowledge, and strategy – rather than to differences among the individuals who 
make up firms.  As a result, little is known about the part that individual firm members play in 
explaining the variance in performance among firms.  The absence of evidence at the individual 
level of analysis also prevents a thorough understanding of which roles beyond those of top 
managers contribute most to firm performance.  This paper employs a Multiple Membership 
Cross-Classified Multilevel Model (MMCC) of 854 computer games which account for over $4 
billion in revenue to test the degree to which organizational or individual factors explain firm 
performance.  The analysis also examines whether individual differences among middle 
managers or innovators best explain firm performance variation.  The results indicate that 
variation among individuals matter far more in organizational performance than is generally 
assumed.  Further, I find that variation among middle managers has a particularly large impact 
on firm performance, much larger than that of those individuals who are assigned innovative 
roles.  These results demonstrate the importance of individual factors in explaining firm 
performance.  The results also show that middle managers are necessary to facilitate firm 
performance in creative, innovative, and knowledge-intensive industries.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1630546
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PEOPLE AND PROCESS, SUITS AND INNOVATORS: INDIVIDUALS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Is firm performance driven by people or by process?  The strategy literature has 
historically argued that a good process is the key to good performance.  The result is a long 
tradition of using organizational factors, rather than differences among individual employees, to 
explain differences in firm performance.  For example, routines (Nelson et al., 1982), firm 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), and resources (Barney, 1991) all operate at the organizational, 
not individual, level.  Even approaches that explain performance differences from a human 
capital perspective usually view employees as an aggregate resource (Wright et al., 2001), and 
focus on organizational processes for developing human capital rather than individuals firm 
members (Hitt et al., 2001). And yet, firms ultimately consist of people whose performance can 
vary widely.  This opens the possibility that, especially in industries with high rates of 
entrepreneurship, or where there are few economies of scale, firm composition – the people who 
actually make up the firm –  may account for much of often widely varying differences in 
performance among firms. Yet despite the potential importance of individuals in explaining 
performance differences between firms, there are few prior studies that separate firm 
performance into compositional differences versus organizational factors, with the exception of 
those studies examining the specialized cases of top management (Bertrand et al., 2003; 
Crossland et al., 2010; Lieberson et al., 1972) and entrepreneurship (Gimeno et al., 1997; 
Johnson, 2007). 
The absence of compositional differences in explaining performance has an additional 
consequence.  It has prevented a thorough understanding of which individuals actually play a 
role in determining firm performance.  It would be reasonable to expect that not all variation 
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among individuals contributes equally to explaining performance differences between firms.  
Top managers, for example, are generally considered to be important in determining firm 
performance, as evidenced by many studies on top management teams (Bertrand et al., 2003; 
Hambrick et al., 1996; Hambrick et al., 1984; Lieberson et al., 1972; Wiersema et al., 1992).  
This impact is based on the expectation that the cognitive and personality differences among the 
most powerful executives in a firm have an influence over strategies and outcomes (Hambrick et 
al., 1984), and so would ultimately explain variation in performance of the firms they lead.  In 
other words, we would expect Apple to behave differently depending on whether Steven Jobs or 
John Scully was CEO.  Much less clear, however, is the impact of variation among the 
individuals who fill the more numerous and less influential role of middle manager. 
  Unlike top managers, middle managers are more constrained by existing organizational 
context, with the effectiveness of managers in product development depending on large part on 
the structure of the organization itself (Katz et al., 2004; Larson et al., 1989) and the interaction 
between top managers and middle managers (Burgelman, 1991, 1994).  Although variation 
among mid-level managers can affect their subordinates (Bidwell et al., 2006), at the wider scale 
of organizational performance, the actions of middle managers are bounded by the nature of the 
firm (Wooldridge et al., 1990).  Therefore, we would expect to see that organizational factors, 
rather than compositional factors, determine much of the impact of middle management on 
performance.  And, in those cases where variation among individuals in mid-level managerial 
roles does explain firm performance, we would expect managers charged with creative or 
innovative tasks to matter more than the ―suits,‖ who are given more standardized managerial 
roles.  This is because creative, innovative, and knowledge work is generally expected to be 
highly variable at the individual level (Brooks Jr, 1978; Stephan, 1996), as these types of work 
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rely on skills where there is evidence of wide distributions in innate ability and inspiration.  We 
can only speculate on the relative contributions of individual variation of middle managers to 
firm performance, however, because no studies measure the performance contribution of these 
two middle manager types across firms.  
   This paper addresses that gap by determining the relative contribution of organizational 
and compositional differences on performance with an analysis of the computer game industry.  
Besides the fact that this industry has features typical of many knowledge-driven industries, 
games represent a case where the tension between the firm and the individual should be at its 
most visible.  On one hand, the game industry is almost entirely organized around formal, 
relatively long-lived firms with well-articulated product strategies; yet, on the other hand, a large 
driver of industry performance should be the innovative output of key individuals.  Additionally, 
success in the game industry relies not just on managers in charge of innovation, but also on 
project managers capable of organizing dozens of programmers and coordinating budgets that 
often reach into the tens of millions of dollars.  Thus the computer game industry is an important 
research site for exploring the contrasts between organizational and individual factors in 
explaining performance differences, as well as the extent to which creative work (as opposed to 
managerial work) is responsible for any individual impact on performance.   
To that end, the paper employs a Multiple Membership Cross-Classified Multilevel 
Model (MMCC) analysis of 854 products across multiple companies to examine the role of 
individuals in innovative and managerial roles as a component in the performance differences 
between firms. The potentially large role of individuals, however, is more than simply another 
way to explain performance differences between firms.  It also offers a challenge to the expected 
role of organizational factors in explaining firm performance. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS, INDIVIDUAL FACTORS 
In a tradition leading back to Weber (1946) and the ideal of the rational bureaucracy 
incorporating individuals into a world of routines and structure, the intuition that organizational, 
industrial, and environmental factors – rather than individual differences – are responsible for 
variations in firm performance is deeply embedded in organizational theory and strategy.  And in 
traditional industries where economies of scale and scope are critical, such as manufacturing, 
there indeed seems to be little need to take individuals into account to explain performance.  
Take, for example, Toyota as described by Adler et. al (1999).  With a six-layered bureaucracy, 
cross-trained workers, and clearly delineated departments, Toyota built a manufacturing 
powerhouse that integrates workers into a complex mechanism to produce cars efficiently.  In the 
Toyota Production System, success is based on routines and organizational processes (Nelson et 
al., 1982) multiplying the effects of the individual workers who are ultimately replaceable and 
interchangeable with others who have received the same extensive training. The result is a 
consistent and reliable process that does not rely on any individual worker’s skills, but rather 
firm-level processes to hire and train the appropriate individuals for the appropriate roles.   
Focusing on firm-level processes, rather than individual variation, as the source of 
performance makes sense in the context of large firms employing economies of scale and scope, 
as is the case in the Toyota Production System.  These traditional firms feature professional 
managers running formal organizations in which no individual, with the possible exception of a 
few top executives, are irreplaceable, and in which individual contributions account for little 
variation in performance.   However, there is reason to suspect that many industries, especially 
those focusing on knowledge work, or where there are few economies of scale, compositional 
factors a critical role in explaining performance differences.  Increasing evidence of the impact 
of compositional differences on firm performance across many industries suggests that we may 
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not be able assume that organizational-level processes are the lowest relevant level of analysis in 
explaining performance differences between firms. For example, we know individual actors can 
have a significant impact on the performance of large organizations, and even entire industries.  
The most common example of this is the entrepreneur, whose individual action may influence 
entire markets (Schumpeter, 1934) and who has a persistent impact on firms long after they are 
founded (Baron et al., 1999; Eisenhardt et al., 1990).   
Outside of entrepreneurship, variation among individuals in innovative capacities seems 
to have a potentially large impact on firm performance.  For example, star scientists who operate 
within firms and universities have a significant individual effects on the performance of firms in 
the biotechnology (Zucker et al., 2001; Zucker et al., 1998) and semiconductor (Torero, 1998) 
industries.   Further, the distribution of ability across innovative roles is highly skewed.  
Software development exhibits extreme individual differences, as studies have demonstrated that 
a top computer programmer typically produces the same amount of work as ten to twenty 
average programmers during any given time period, and with fewer errors (Cusumano, 2004; 
Sackman et al., 1968).  A similar skew is found in scientific research, where Lotka’s Law 
observes that just six percent of publishing scientists are responsible for fifty percent of all 
publications, a difference due at least in part to varying abilities among scientists (Stephan, 
1996).  In general, there are substantial ranges of variation in performance among individuals in 
most fields that involve creative and knowledge work (Simonton, 2003).  We would therefore 
expect that individuals in innovative roles would contribute to variation in firm performance. 
More elusive is the effect of individual managers on firm performance.  Recent research 
on top management teams has shown that CEOs, CFOs, and other top-level executives can have 
an effect on large firms, although the magnitude of their impact is limited. Bertrand and Schoar 
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(2003) find that these top position explain less than 5% of the variation in firm performance 
among Fortune 800 companies, compared with between 34% and 72% of the variation explained 
by firm-level fixed effects.  The impact of middle managers, those managers who operate in the 
levels below C-level executives but above line managers (Wooldridge et al., 1990), is much less 
clear.  Middle managers with particular personality traits and positions inside the organization 
play a role in facilitating innovation (Moss Kanter, 1982), communication (Allen, 1971), and 
selecting projects to pursue (Burgelman, 1991), but the success of managers is heavily dependent 
on the structure of the organizations in which they are placed (Katz et al., 2004).  According to 
this perspective, the impact of middle managers on performance is determined by firm structure 
and culture, rather than individual differences (King et al., 2001; Westley, 1990). Thus, we 
would expect managers to contribute less than innovators to variation, and that much of the 
impact of managers on performance would appear as organization-level effects.  I will next test 
this presumed relationship between managers and innovators, and between firms and individuals, 
in the computer game industry. 
ANALYSIS 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING: THE GAME INDUSTRY 
 
While there are strong theoretical reasons to challenge the idea that variations in firm 
performance are explained primarily by organizational factors in knowledge work, actually 
separating individual and firm performance has historically been highly problematic.  This is 
reflected in a literature on firm performance variation that focuses on contributions to firm 
performance from organizational or industry-wide factors, rather than individuals.  Instead, 
factors such as  industry structure (Schmalensee, 1985), country-level effects (Makino et al., 
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2004), and  routines and capabilities (McGahan et al., 1997; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 
1991) have been important foci of analysis.  The exception are a few papers that focus on the 
role of top managers or entrepreneurs  in explaining  performance variation (Bertrand et al., 
2003; Crossland et al., 2010; Hargadon et al., 2001).  
In particular, the paper by Bertrand and Schoar (2003), who focus on top-level managers 
in their study, offers the clearest effort so far in teasing apart the roles of individuals and 
organizations through variance decomposition.   Bertrand and Schoar examined the role of top 
managers on Fortune 800 firms using a fixed effect regression to separate out the effects of 
individual leaders and firms.  They found that the combined effects of CEOs, CFOs, and other 
top managers on Forbes 800 firm performance explains less than 5% of the variation in firm 
performance.  This is in-line with most theories of firm performance: in large, established 
organizations, the top managers, at least, contribute relatively little to firm performance. 
Part of the difficulty of moving beyond top managers in understanding the contribution of 
individuals to firm performance is that it requires particularly rich data.  The dataset must allow 
the tracking of a wide range of individuals and their jobs longitudinally, something best done 
with product-level data, with identifiable team members on each project. Firms must use 
multiple people for the same role and individuals also need to move across multiple firms so that 
performance is comparable both between and within firms, matching multiple combinations of 
individual team members and firms over time.  Further, it would be useful if the types of roles 
varied, to encompass both innovative (and therefore more portable and variable) jobs and less-
portable traditional managerial jobs that presumably are more tied to firm-specific routines and 
knowledge.  Finally, an appropriate industry would offer a dynamic environment of firms, with 
opportunities for both new ventures and larger, long-standing organizations.  
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The video game industry matches all of these requirements and offers a particularly 
valuable perspective into the world of firms and markets.  That is because each game has an 
identifiable, credited team of creators, including a development team of designers, programmers, 
and artists.  These teams, in turn, work for developers, game programming firms ranging from 
just a few people to several thousand employees. These firms may produce dozens of games a 
year.  Because accurate credits at both the individual and firm level are available for many games 
developed within the industry, it is possible to trace precisely both the individuals and firms 
responsible for innovation and entrepreneurship within the industry. 
Now nearly thirty years old, electronic gaming software is a major industry, with over 
$25.4 billion in software revenues in 2005, and over 144,000 fulltime employees in the United 
States alone in 2004 (Crandall et al., 2006).  It also straddles the line between creative industries 
and knowledge-intensive industries, combining elements of entertainment and technological 
innovation.  The dual nature of the game industry is best seen through its two key roles, the 
managerial role of producer and the innovative role of designer.   
Producers, despite the similarity in name, have very little in common with the eponymous 
job in the entertainment world
1
, matching more closely the role of project manager in the 
software industry.  A producer ―is ultimately responsible for every aspect of the game.  It is the 
producer’s job to make sure that the project is completed on time and on budget, while 
maintaining a commitment to industry standards‖ (Irish, 2005). This includes team management, 
                                                                
1
 This blurring was sometimes purposeful in the early days of the game industry, when it aspired to the luster of 
Hollywood. For example, the term “producer” to describe the role of product manager was first used in 1982 by 
Trip Hawkins, founder of Electronic Arts, who had previously worked as an early in employee of Apple. Despite no 
experience in films, he choose to use terms from the film industry, in a case of what one industry analyst called 
"Hollywood envy.” Crawford C. 1995. Hollywood Envy. Interactive Entertainment Design 8 
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resource allocation, team communication, and external relations ranging from PR to interfacing 
with company management.  
In fact, the scale of modern game projects rivals most enterprise software efforts, and 
uses many of the same techniques.  Though the size and scope of games vary widely, one game 
from 2004 may serve as an example of the complexity of the game development process.  In that 
case, the core team consisted of 35 people, who, over the course of 18 months wrote 480,000 
lines of code, separated into 740 computer instruction files, with a budget of $7 million (Hardy, 
2004).  Games can easily reach over 3 million lines of code, and cost up to $50 million with 
hundreds of employees involved, which represents a more significant effort than many business 
applications.  Thus, while innovation and creativity are important in the game industry, the 
execution of the concept resembles standard software development.   It is also critical to note that 
despite superficial resemblances to Hollywood in areas like job titles, the operation of game 
companies is much closer to that of other software companies, including incorporation of 
standard programming techniques, bug testing, and quality assurance.  
The second role of interest is that of the designer, who invents game ideas and is in 
charge of guiding the development team to make his vision a reality.  In the words of one 
guidebook to the industry, ―the game designer is the center of creativity in the game industry. 
From the designer’s vision emerges the entertainment, in the form of game play and story... the 
game designer needs to be a Renaissance man or woman—they must be able to understand 
people and story and character, but also to understand logic and sequence and interaction in a 
very precise way.‖  (Baldwin, 2006: 37) Designers often start their careers as programmers, and 
are usually very involved in the day-to-day technical work involved in building a game.  While 
there are a handful of famous game designers, the vast majority is unknown, and, in interviews, 
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even other game designers were not able to recall the names of designers of some of the best-
selling games of the past few years. 
Between them, designers and producers are responsible for the overall execution of a 
game.  The average game design team in the sample has 56 people, and often several dozen more 
temporary workers, such as voice actors and beta testers. There may be several designers and 
producers on each project.  The designers fill the lead innovative roles, and the producers, the 
managerial roles.  Having both of these job descriptions allows us to examine the effects of 
individual differences by job function: innovative roles where we would expect individual 
variation to be quite high (designers) and managerial roles where presumably variation in 
performance is less (producers). 
These individuals do not operate independently; they are part of firms known as game 
developers.  Game developers are almost always organizations as well as firms; less than 1% of 
all games with identifiable revenues were the work of lone individuals, and less than 2.5% of all 
games credited fewer than five people.  Since video game firms are standalone organizations, 
they are not directly comparable to the diversified companies featured in many variance 
decomposition efforts (McGahan et al., 1997; Roquebert et al., 1996).  However, game 
developers exhibit the characteristics we would expect to see in firms in most industries.  For 
example, the firms in the sample have average lifespans that exceed a decade, and, on average, 
over 200 uniquely identified individuals have participated in each firm’s core teams during the 
life of the firm, though the actual number of employees is likely much larger than the number 
credited.  
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In addition to game developers, there is an additional role that firms play in the game 
industry, that of game publishers. Publishers fund game development, and also distribute and 
market end products for a share of the revenue. Some game developers also operate as 
publishers, such as Electronic Arts, but the role is often separated into two different companies.  
Since publishers have little impact on the day-to-day process of game development, they are not 
dealt with in detail in this study, although potential effects are controlled for in later analyses.  
Additionally, while there are several subsets of the video game market, I have chosen to 
focus specifically on one segment, PC games, as opposed to console games like those that run on 
the Nintendo, Xbox, or Sony systems.  There are a number of advantages to examining PC 
games, which make up about 15% of all games sales in recent years.  First, as compared to the 
console game industry, barriers to entry are quite small, as the PC is an open platform, and there 
are no requirements imposed by manufacturers, as there are with console games.  Therefore, we 
would expect to see the widest diversity of organizational forms in this submarket.  Secondly, PC 
games have tended to be the innovation leader in the game space, since PC technical 
characteristics were decisively ahead of consoles through 2006 – almost all major game genres 
have begun on the PC first.  This is supported by one well-regarded review of game-based 
innovation, 55% of important innovations in gameplay originated on the PC, compared with 
17.5% on consoles, and the remainder in arcades or other platforms (Adams, 2007).  Finally, PC 
games with low-quality graphics but innovative gameplay have been very successful, allowing 
PC game developers with wide ranges of resources to compete in a market where highly 
innovative, if primitive-looking, games can still find an audience.  In contrast, almost all console 
games need to be at the technical frontiers of a particular system in order to be judged as 
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relevant, making high graphics and sound quality a priority, and requiring large teams and 
significant investment in almost every case, while often discouraging innovation. 
 
EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Given this rich research setting, actually decomposing variance in performance among 
firms, innovators (designers), and managers (producers) is a challenge.   Traditional methods of 
performance decomposition, including nested ANOVA (Bertrand et al., 2003; McGahan et al., 
2002; Rumelt, 1991) and Variance Composition Analysis (McGahan et al., 1997; Schmalensee, 
1985) are problematic. ANOVA can be sensitive to colinearity and the way in which the data is 
nested, and VCA can yield unreliable results (Hough, 2006).  Indeed, a nested ANOVA approach 
using the data in the sample was highly sensitive to the order of entry, though it roughly 
confirmed the results of the model used in this paper.  Multilevel modeling  offers an approach to 
separating out variance components that avoids many of these issues (Crossland et al., 2010; 
Hough, 2006).  The dataset has two features that complicate the calculation of the multilevel 
model, but also allow the estimation of both individual and firm-level effects simultaneously.   
The first feature of the data is that it is cross-classified.  Individuals move between firms, 
and are therefore not part of a strict hierarchy, as usually assumed in multilevel modeling.  The 
cross-classification of individuals and firms allows the observation of separate firm and 
individual effects, though they require techniques that do not assume nested data.  The second 
feature of the data is multiple membership – over a third of games had more than one designer, 
and over a quarter had more than one producer.   Multiple membership requires that the 
individual contributions to performance be weighted to account for the number of individual 
designers and producers.  Multiple Membership Cross-Classified Multilevel Models (MMCC), 
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which encompass both of these conditions, have been used in education research to separate out 
the effects of primary schools, secondary schools, and neighborhoods on student performance 
(Browne et al., 2001).  Within this research tradition, recent work by Leckie (2009) on MMCCs 
with similar structure to this dataset offers an empirical approach to understanding the sources of 
performance differences among firms. 
Since the cross-classification can quickly make the subscripts of the model unwieldy and 
difficult to parse
2
, the model is written using ―classification notation,‖ where each level of the 
model can be written with a single superscript (Browne et al., 2001).  The classifications 
themselves are shown in Figure 1, and the model, derived from Leckie (2009) is as follows: 

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In this case, yi is the revenue of a game, Bxi is the matrix of game-level controls or predictors.  
There are three levels of classification, identified by the raised parenthetical superscripts and 
subscripts: (2) for producers, (3) for designers, and (4) for firms.  
 )(
)2()2(
,
iproducerj
jji uw and

 )(
)3()3(
,
idesignerj
ijji
uw are producer-level and designer-level random effects weighted for the number of 
                                                                
2
 Standard multilevel notation would be ijkljklklliijklijkl euvfBxBy 00000  where f is the firm 
level, v are the weighted producers, and u are the weighted designers for the ith game. 
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designers and producers working on a game, )4( )(ifirmu   are firm-level random effects, and ei are 
game-level random effects.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The classification functions producer(i), designer(i), and firm(i) give the set of the 
producers, designers, and firm for the ith game. As can be seen from the functions, games can 
have more than one producer or designer, but only one firm. Finally, wi,
(2)
j and wi,
(3)
j are the 
weights for the number of producers and developers on each project, which sum to 1. The model 
is run using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods in MLwiN for 5,000 iterations with a 
500 iteration burn-in (Browne et al., 2001).  The MCMC algorithm, as developed by Leckie 
(2009), is used to estimate the cross-classified multilevel model. 
After calculating the model, I then generate the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) by 
taking the variance of each level over the sum of the variance of the other levels and error term 
(Goldstein et al., 2002). VPC is the proportion of the total variance accounted for by one level of 
the model compared to the other levels of the model and the Level 1 variation that remains once 
the predictors are accounted for.  It is a measure of the residual correlation between two 
individuals within the same level of the model, and thus it is also known as intra-unit 
correlation.  After controlling for game-level effects, VPC will give us the proportion of variance 
in game performance explained by designers, producers, companies, as well as the proportion of 
variance not explained by any level of the model. 
THE DATASET 
For this analysis, I used a unique dataset, the MobyGames database. An internet 
repository of game information, MobyGames lists their goal as: ―To meticulously catalog all 
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relevant information about electronic games on a game-by-game basis, and then offer up that 
information through flexible queries and data mining. In layman's terms, it's a huge game 
database.” MobyGames has information on over 34,000 games, all entered by users of the site 
on a volunteer basis, according to a detailed set of coding instuctions. To ensure accuracy, 
MobyGames requires peer review for all data entered into the database before such data is 
accepted.   Though the database is not complete, in that there is not full information for all 
games, the data are of high quality and normalized to well-established standards established by 
MobyGames. The dependent variable data come from additional sources, as discussed later. 
The full dataset on the PC games industry covers twenty-five years from 1981 to 2006 
and contains 5,794 games with full credits and normalized titles.  As will be discussed, the data 
are further matched with revenue information.  Since performance data was limited to 
commercial games sold between 1994 and 2006, this culled the sample somewhat: 1,970 credited 
games had revenue information. These games involved a substantial number of individuals in the 
development process.  Core team sizes ranging from 1 to 395, with a mean of 52 people in the 
core team for games which have both credits and performance information 
 In order to differentiate between firm and individual effects, the analysis includes 
designers and producers who worked on more than one game, and who worked with other 
combinations of designers and producers, rather than repeatedly being part of the same team at 
the same company.  Dropping games with individuals that did not meet those criteria resulted in 
a final sample of 854 games using revenue information, accounting for just over $4 billion of 
revenue. This ultimately allowed me to incorporate 537 individual producers, 739 individual 
designers, and 395 companies in the revenue model.  While designers and producers analyzed 
will obviously tend to have a longer industry tenure and more games to their credit than the 
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average individual who is not part of the analysis, their project history is generally not 
significantly different. However, the limit of the analysis to only those individuals who worked 
on more than one game, and often at more than one company, is a potential cause of concern 
because of recent research that has discovered that, under some conditions, skills are not portable 
between firms (Groysberg et al., 2008; Huckman et al., 2006). Comparisons between the sample 
group and the general population, which can be seen in Table 1, gives us some confidence that 
the sampled designers and producers remain representative.  .    
    INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
VARIABLES 
Using the data on individual games, we will use the MMCC model to separate out the 
extent to which project success is attributable to individual designers, producers, and firms, as 
opposed to all other factors.  I use the revenue generated by a game as a dependent variable, as 
well as a wide variety of control (or predictor, in MMCC parlance) variables used in the analysis.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Revenue  Between 1995 and 2006, research company NPD Funworld tracked the sales data of 
every PC game sold through US retail channels for most major retailers, and projected revenues 
for the rest.  This dataset was matched with the MobyGames dataset, and a total of $8.2B worth 
of revenue was identifiably linked with games in the database.  As PC games are, in part, a hit-
driven industry (average revenue was $3.2M, but the best-selling PC game of all time, The Sims, 
sold $260M, more than twice its closest competitor), I used the more normally-distributed log of 
revenue (lrevenue) for my analysis.   
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   INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
I excluded from my analysis of revenue all expansion packs, which are value-added 
games that will only operate with the original software package, and that add features or 
additional gameplay elements.  Since the performance of expansion packs on the market are 
circumscribed by the sales of the games on which they expand, they are not easily comparable. I 
did not include ―casual games‖ which consist of card games and puzzle games, ―adult‖-oriented 
titles, and educational games, as they are generally considered to represent separate markets from 
the standard PC games industry. 
CONTROL/PREDICTOR VARIABLES 
In order to isolate the effects of individuals and firms, I controlled for a number of factors: 
Team Size  
 
Core team size is a good estimate of cost and effort associated with a game, as 
personnel costs are the primary expense of most development companies (Rosmarin, 2006). 
Additionally, a large core team size would indicate a more challenging managerial environment, 
with more need for coordination among multiple individuals.  I use the concept of core team so 
as to include only those credited individuals who are involved throughout the development of a 
typical product.  This excludes specialized roles such as testers, researchers, voice actors, and 
movie production crew that are limited to a subset of games.  The core team includes designers, 
producers, programmers, artists, and management. The median team size for games with known 
revenue is 53, though they range from 2 to 293 in size. 
Year  The market for games can vary from year to year, as both the economy and related 
markets, such as video game consoles, vary.  Year controls for the release date of each game in 
the United States, or, for games that launch in multiple countries, the worldwide release date.   
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Genre  Games can be published in a number of genres, ranging from business simulations to 
―shoot-em-up‖ arcade games.  These genres may attract different audiences and thus have 
different market receptions. Since designers and producers could potentially specialize in 
particular types of games, I control for five separate genres and the combinations thereof: action-
adventure, racing and driving, sports, role-playing games (RPGs), and simulation-strategy 
games.  Individual games can be coded with multiple genres, such as a game that includes both 
role-playing and sports elements. While designers and producers may have particular genres of 
interest, game developers in the sample as a whole do not tend to specialize in particular genres, 
and every genre but educational games had at least one third of firms working, at least in part, in 
that genre.  These genres are coded by individuals entering them into MobyGames, and go 
through at least one peer review before being accepted.   
Publisher  In addition to developers, game publishing firms play an important role in the PC 
game industry.  Though the financial effects of publisher funding is captured by team size, there 
could potentially be an effect where larger publishers, with more resources and more experience, 
have better ability to develop top titles.  I use the total number of games published by a particular 
publisher through the year prior to the game’s launch as a control for any publisher effects on 
game performance.  
Sequel and Licensed  Two additional game-level characteristics are whether a game is the 
sequel of a previous game, and whether it includes licensed content. Licensed content refers to 
intellectual property from an outside source (such as a movie or television program) that has 
been incorporated into the game. Sequels and licensed content could offer additional name 
recognition to games, thus boasting their appeal relative to new or unlicensed games. 
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RESULTS  
Table 3 shows the results of the MMCC model. The results are divided into fixed effects 
and the random effects at the levels of producers, designers, and firms.  Table 4 shows the 
Variance Partition Coefficient, or the proportion of variance explained by each level of the 
model (Goldstein et al., 2002), for all individuals, and for a subset of data, discussed below, 
which includes only those individuals who move between firms. 
 
    INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
    INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The analysis shows that behind the veil of the firm, variation in individual managers and 
innovators has a both large and significant effect on the success of individual projects. The 
impact of producers – the mid-level project managers – is especially high.  Individual producers 
account for 22.3% of the variation in revenue, after accounting for game-level predictors.  
Individual designers, perhaps surprisingly, had only a marginally significant impact on revenue, 
explaining 7.4% of variation
3
.  In total, the individuals in just these two roles accounted for 
29.7% of the variation for the products for which they were responsible.  Additionally, the 
individuals with the managerial role of producer explained more of the variation in performance 
than the individuals who filled the innovative role of designer. 
                                                                
3
 Removing the developer level from the revenue model, however, reduces the fit and parsimony of the model.  
The Bayesian Deviance Information Criterion increases from 1345 to 1370 when the developer level is removed. 
Differences of 10 or more are considered substantive.  Spiegelhalter DJ, Best NG, Carlin BP, van der Linde A. 2002. 
Bayesian measures of model complexity and fit. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical 
Methodology) 64(4): 583-639).  
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Firms are also significant, though they explain slightly less variation than do individual 
producers, 21.3%.  Additionally, the variation explained at the firm level likely overstates the 
importance of organizational-level processes relative to individuals because they likely 
incorporate some of the impact of people not given in the credits, such as marketers and 
company leaders, in addition to other factors which may have been left out of the controls.  
While some variations in revenue are, of course, attributable to firm-level effects directly, the 
variations in the performance of individuals for these two roles alone is at least as important.  
To test the robustness of this result, the model was applied to only those producers and 
designers who moved between firms during their career, excluding those who only moved 
internally within organizations, as can be seen in Table 4.  This sample of only peripatetic 
individuals should result in fairly similar contributions from designers and producers, but a lower 
contribution from firms, since including only moving individuals would likely underemphasize 
in-firm learning and improvement. As expected, the producer and designer components of 
variance proved robust compared to the full model (producers explained 24.1% of the variation 
in revenues, a slight increase, and designers 6.3%, a slight decrease).  Also as expected, the 
contribution of firms to performance variation dropped somewhat to 15.5%.  These results 
suggest the robustness of the individual level measures, and that firm-level contributions to 
variance, may be, in part, shaped by within-team learning and improvement, rather than only 
firm-specific routines. 
There are a number of limitations to this study.  First, the game industry may serve as a 
special case, with its low capital requirements, low barriers to entry, and relatively fluid 
employment systems making it more suited to individual achievement than other industries.  
However, the game industry does echo aspects of other highly innovative industries where entry 
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barriers are low and entrepreneurship is common– such as software, web services, and 
biotechnology – and which might serve as future models for study.  Also, the fact that 
managerial producers explained more of the variation in performance than innovative designers 
indicates that the importance of individuals is not limited to innovative roles, and so is likely not 
purely an artifact of creative industries.   
A second limitation is that some of the characteristics controlled for in the product level 
of analysis, such as the game genre or publisher, may be the result of selection or strategy by 
firms, and thus may be part of the firm level variance.  Though developers in the sample did not 
tend to specialize in any genre, and the average sample developer had 2.8 publishers, it is likely 
that firms have some control over genre and publisher selection.  As a conservative test of the 
effects of firm strategy over these elements, I re-ran the MMCC model without publisher or 
genre controls.  This results in an increase in the percent of variation explained by the firm from 
21% to 31%, while developer (21%) and producer (6%) contributions to variance stay roughly 
similar to the full model.   If the increase in variance is explained by firm selection of publisher 
or genre, 31% of variance establishes a useful upper bound for firm contribution, and the 
differences between managers and innovators is unchanged. However, this change in the 
variance explained at the firm level may be due to the fact that these controls affect firm-level 
characteristics.  For example, firms have publishers, individual designers and producers do not, 
so even if firms don’t select their publisher, a lack of publisher control will likely affect firm-
level variance.   
Finally, there is the possibility that some of the variation explained by designers and 
producers is due to selection by firms, that firms pick the best (or worst) designers or producers 
for their best (or worse) games, thus increasing the variation explained by individuals at the 
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expense of firms.  For most game companies, however, the selection issue is less relevant, 
because the generation of ideas for games is usually the job of individual designers, sometimes in 
conjunction with producers.  This, in turn, determines initial staffing in most cases, ensuring that 
selection of producers and designers is not the function of high-level firm executives alone.  
Regardless, the results of the analysis of only those individuals who move between firms (See 
Table 4) provides some comfort that this effect is likely to be limited.  Since moving individuals 
are less likely to have deep performance records with their new firms, we would expect any team 
selection by firms to be less informed.  If selection does play a major role, we would expect to 
see some decrease in the variation explained by producers or designers for this sample, but, as 
Table 4 indicates, the differences are minor. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
These results exceed by a large margin the threshold of the performance derived from 
individuals that we would expect to see from traditional views of the firm where organizational 
and environmental, rather than compositional, factors that drive performance.  Especially given 
that variance is not also partitioned to cover the individual-level contribution from other 
important team members (such as programmers and artists), it is unclear how significant firm-
level processes actually are in explaining performance, but they are, at most, on the same scale as 
the role played by just one individual within the product team.   The effects of individuals in this 
case also greatly exceed those found in Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for top-level executives.  Far 
from being interchangeable, individuals uniquely contribute to the success or failure of a firm.   
Additionally, the relative contribution of the two roles to firm-level variation is also 
unexpected.  Even in a young industry that rewards creative and innovative products, innovative 
roles explain far less variation in firm performance than do managers.  This is surprising for two 
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reasons.  First, we would expect that individual variation in innovative roles would be greater 
than that of more standardized managerial roles.  Second, given the research tradition on the 
importance of organizational factors to facilitate the success of middle managers (Westley, 1990; 
Wooldridge et al., 1990), the finding that individual managers account for more variation in 
performance than firm-level factors in some occasions is particularly intriguing.  
Rather than acting as cogs in the machine, dwarfed by organizational level effects, the 
effect of managers on firm performance was actually larger than that of organizational factors, 
implying that individual managerial differences play an outsized role in firm performance, even 
over the $4 billion in revenue generated by games in the sample.  Though this finding might 
seem surprising at the scale of firms and industries, it is supported by intrafirm-level research on 
the role of middle managers in the innovation process. 
Recent research on the role of individuals and groups in industries as diverse as 
consulting (Hargadon et al., 2006) and comic books (Taylor et al., 2006) supports a longer 
literature on project management (see Brown, (1995)) that has demonstrated the complex 
interaction between individuals and teams in successful innovation.  The finding that managers 
have significantly more impact on firm performance than individual innovators aligns with this 
tradition.  It suggests that high-performing innovators alone are not enough to generate 
performance variation; rather, it is the role of individual managers to integrate and coordinate the 
innovative work of others. 
One insight into this phenomenon can be found in the work of Bower (1970) and  
Burgelman (1983, 1991) on the often complex internal ecologies of firms.  Drawing on the 
evolutionary model of variation, selection, and retention (Aldrich, 1999), Burgelman (1991) 
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views middle managers as the agents of selection, while innovative managers serve as sources of 
variation, generating the ideas from which the ―suits‖ select.  Burgelman’s process model would 
suggest that the large amount of variation explained by the managers relative to the innovators 
may be due to this selection role.  From this perspective, innovators may still be the source of all 
new game ideas and concepts, but since the managers decide which ideas are actually allocated 
resources, it is the managers’ selection ability that is ultimately measured in the model. 
Indeed, this resource allocation perspective likely explains part of why middle managers 
account for more variation in performance than innovators, but it is not a complete picture.  In 
the video game industry, the separation between the variation and selection roles is less clear 
than at Intel and other large firms.  Designers are not merely sources of variation, but also, by 
necessity, are responsible for part of the selection process as well.  Since games represent a 
complex system, designers have to be able to optimize their work within constraints, or risk 
having the entire system collapsed when a single element is removed due to resource limitations.  
In the words of Rouse (2005), ―It is a very rare case for a designer to be able to think of whatever 
game she wants and then search out the perfect implementation of that idea. In almost all cases, 
the designer is limited by the situation presented to her… Though the producer is primarily 
responsible for making sure that the game is on time and on budget, the designer must concern 
herself with all of the limitations she is faced with.‖   
Additionally, the performance variation explained by middle managers is relatively 
constant even if we consider only those managers who move between firms.  Previous process 
models, which examine resource allocation at larger firms (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983, 
1994), place considerable emphasis on the ways in which middle managers, as agents of 
selection, understand and execute the strategy developed by senior management.  Where firms 
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with farsighted top managers are able to communicate strategy to middle managers, the selection 
process is more likely to be beneficial (Burgelman, 1994).  In this case, however, the importance 
of middle managers persists across multiple firms, each of which has their own strategy and 
process for carrying out that strategy.  This suggests that differences in middle managers 
themselves, and not just their selection role in the internal ecology of particular firms, explains 
part of the variation in performance. 
The selection function of middle managers is still salient for producers, and explains part 
of why they account for so much variation in performance.  However, the selection role played 
by middle managers is of a different tenor than that of organizations where economies of scale or 
scope are important.  It is more likely to occur working in conjunction with innovators, rather 
than as a separate selection process between front-line managers and top management that 
determines which ideas are to be pursued (Burgelman, 1994).   The result is a process that 
depends heavily on the individual skills of middle managers to facilitate and guide innovative 
teams through the selection process, and less on their role as the layer between top management 
and innovators.  Middle managers may ultimately decide which ideas proceed, and which are not 
selected, but they may do so best by working with innovators directly, as happens in the game 
industry. For example, good managers may be able to help whittle down a designer’s product 
ideas into a realistic project plan, while a less capable manager working with a more capable 
designer may be unable to translate a better design into reality. 
In addition to their selection role, middle managers may play a greater part in producing 
variation than is often credited to the much maligned ―suits‖ in creative industries.  Indeed, the 
role of middle managers in facilitating team performance is supported by the product 
development literature (Brown et al., 1995), which suggests that managers may play a crucial 
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role in motivating team creativity and performance. Additionally, it is likely that certain 
managers are good at facilitating the sort of collective creativity that results in high-quality 
products (Hargadon et al., 2006), while others are less capable of making their teams more than 
the sum of their parts.  Finally, producers may also interact directly with designers to contribute 
creative concepts themselves.  Regardless of the details of the mechanism, it suggests that the 
oft-overlooked middle manager may play a far greater role in industry-wide innovation than is 
typically acknowledged.   
CONCLUSION 
While any population of firms is ultimately heterogeneous at some level of analysis, the 
general assumption has been that variations in firm performance are largely the result of 
processes, rather than people.  Using a Multiple Membership Cross-Classified Multilevel Model, 
this paper argues that the performance of organizations may actually vary greatly as the 
individuals within the firms vary. Further, it is the individuals who fill the role of middle 
managers – the ―suits‖ – rather than the creative innovators that best explain variation in firm 
performance.   While these findings may vary across industries, and even within industries, they 
suggest that scholars should pay more attention to the individual makeup of organizations, rather 
than focusing solely on organizational-level characteristics.  Finally, this paper underlines the 
importance of middle managers, who are critical to firm performance even in highly innovative 
industries, and suggests the need for further research into the mechanisms by which middle 
managers influence firm performance. 
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Figure 1: Cross-Classification Diagram 
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Table 1: Means for Sampled Individuals with Compared with All Individuals 
(SD in parentheses)  
 N Games  Log(Revenue)/  
Game  
All Designers  
(N=3805)  
4.2 
(4.8)  
6.15 
(.72)  
Sample Designers  
(N=739)  
7.5* 
(6.5)  
6.20 
(.68) 
 
 N Games  Log(Revenue)/  
Game  
All Producers  
(N=2827)  
5.7 
(6.0)  
6.10 
(.72) 
Sample Producers  
(N=537)  
9.64* 
(7.73)  
6.10 
(.62)  
 
* p <.05  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables for Games with Rank and Revenue 
Information 
(SD in parentheses) 
  Mean Action Strat Sports Edu. RPG Licensed Sequel Pub. lRev Core 
Action 
0.56 1 
         
Strategy or Sim 0.50 -0.66 1 
        
Sports 
0.11 -0.24 -0.11 1 
       
Educational 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 1 
      
RPG 0.14 0.17 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 1 
     
Licensed 0.21 0.07 -0.13 0.17 -0.03 -0.02 1 
    
Sequel 0.39 -0.08 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.01 0.06 1 
   
Publisher 47.18 
(62.3) 
-0.14 0.06 0.15 -0.01 0.02 0.12 0.21 1 
  
Log(Revenue) 6.08 
(.74) 
-0.07 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.27 0.33 1 
 
Core Team 53.0 
(41.2) 
0.10 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.19 0.06 0.16 0.27 0.36 1 
Year 1999.8 
(3.5) 
0.06 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.31 
 
N=854
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Table 3: Revenue MMCC Results 
  Coefficient SE 
  Fixed Portion of the Model 
Core Team 
 
0.005** 0.001 
Publisher 
 
0.002** 0.000 
Action_genre 
 
-0.083 0.066 
Education_genre 
 
0.410* 0.211 
RPG_genre 
 
0.169** 0.071 
Strat/Sim_genre  0.015 0.066 
Sports_genre  -0.186* 0.083 
Licensed  0.152** 0.061 
Sequel  0.213** 0.047 
 Random Portion of the Model 
Company  0.092** 0.028 
Producer  0.096** 0.029 
Designer  0.032+ 0.025 
Error  0.211** 0.022 
 
+ p <.10      * p <.05    ** p <.01 
Model includes year controls in fixed portion.  
N=854, Bayesian Deviance Information Criterion (DIC)= 1345.22 (See Spiegelhalter (2002)) 
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Table 5: Partition of Variance 
 
 
 
 
 Individuals Who 
Move Firms Only 
All 
Individuals 
Firm 
0.155 0.213 
Producer 
0.241 0.223 
Designer 
0.063 0.074 
Error 
0.541 0.431 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
